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Voter information campaigns and political 
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Gareth Nellis6, Claire L. Adida6, Eric Arias7, Clara Bicalho4, Taylor C. Boas8, Mark T. Buntaine9, 
Simon Chauchard10, Anirvan Chowdhury1, Jessica Gottlieb11, F. Daniel Hidalgo12, 
Marcus Holmlund13, Ryan Jablonski14, Eric Kramon15, Horacio Larreguy16, Malte Lierl17, 
John Marshall3, Gwyneth McClendon18, Marcus A. Melo19, Daniel L. Nielson20, Paula M. Pickering7, 
Melina R. Platas21, Pablo Querubín18, Pia Raffler16, Neelanjan Sircar22,23
Voters may be unable to hold politicians to account if they lack basic information about their representatives’ 
performance. Civil society groups and international donors therefore advocate using voter information campaigns 
to improve democratic accountability. Yet, are these campaigns effective? Limited replication, measurement 
heterogeneity, and publication biases may undermine the reliability of published research. We implemented a new 
approach to cumulative learning, coordinating the design of seven randomized controlled trials to be fielded in 
six countries by independent research teams. Uncommon for multisite trials in the social sciences, we jointly 
preregistered a meta-analysis of results in advance of seeing the data. We find no evidence overall that typical, 
nonpartisan voter information campaigns shape voter behavior, although exploratory and subgroup analyses sug-
gest conditions under which informational campaigns could be more effective. Such null estimated effects are too 
seldom published, yet they can be critical for scientific progress and cumulative, policy-relevant learning.
INTRODUCTION
Voters often have limited information about the performance of their 
political representatives. These information gaps may undermine 
democratic accountability: According to many accounts, officials 
whose actions are shielded from public scrutiny are less responsive 
to constituents’ concerns and more likely to engage in corruption (1). 
Providing reliable performance information prior to elections may 
allow voters to select politicians who are more likely to serve them 
well (2, 3).
Civil society groups and international donors therefore seek to 
remedy information deficits. For example, the National Democratic 
Institute has invested in over 15,000 civil society groups globally, with 
the goal of deepening citizens’ democratic participation by increasing 
political knowledge. Typical interventions package factual, objective 
information about politicians’ behavior in easily understood formats 
and disseminate it to voters via information technology and door-
to-door canvassing. See, for instance, the Voting Information Project 
in the United States, funded by Pew Charitable Trusts, International 
IDEA’s democratic accountability efforts, or the Transparency and 
Accountability Initiative (4, 5).
Are these voter information campaigns effective? While infor-
mation may allow voters to sanction politicians’ poor performance, 
other theories suggest that voters may not update their beliefs readily 
in response to new information (6–10). Experimental studies paint 
a mixed picture (5, 11–14). Yet, previous research may suffer from 
three difficulties that generally hinder the accumulation of evidence 
in the social sciences: limited replication, heterogeneity of measure-
ment and design, and publication biases (15–22). These challenges 
foster reliance on single, high-profile studies in particular contexts 
and make it infeasible or unwise to pool data in a formal meta-analysis. 
The dissemination of studies finding positive effects, but more rarely 
those showing null results, runs the risk of overstating the efficacy 
of typical interventions. The published literature, thus, does not 
readily permit generalizable conclusions about the effects of efforts 
to alleviate information deficits.
The Metaketa Initiative: Cumulative learning  
through collaboration
To address these recurrent problems, we collectively implemented a 
new approach to cumulative learning. Seven independent research 
teams coordinated on the design of randomized trials in six developing 
countries, where information deficits are acute. The studies focused 
on a common research question and closely harmonized theory, 
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measurement, and estimation. Each study included an intervention 
that was coordinated across the studies, as well as one or more study- 
specific interventions. Through this inclusion of both “common arm” 
and study-specific treatments, we sought to address disincentives that 
researchers might face in coordinating and replicating interventions. 
Thus, this structure seeks both to bolster cumulative learning, through 
coordination on the common arm, and to allow for innovation and 
analysis of comparative effectiveness through the study-specific arms. 
Given the premium placed on novelty and differentiation in much 
scientific work, preserving distinctions between studies while also 
promoting commonalities may be critical for inducing researchers’ 
interest in this approach.
We jointly preregistered our meta-analysis of effects from the seven 
studies before fielding interventions, which is unusual for multisite 
trials in the social sciences. To limit publication biases, we also 
committed to integrated publication of results regardless of the find-
ings. Our cluster of studies comprised the inaugural project of the 
Metaketa Initiative, organized by the Evidence in Governance and 
Politics (EGAP) network, which seeks to incentivize replication, ensure 
coordination between researchers to enhance aggregation of findings, 
and encourage design and reporting standards that guard against 
selective reporting and publication bias (metaketa is a Basque word 
meaning “accumulation”). Our approach is related to the innovative 
multisite experiments of Banerjee et al. (23), who did not, however, 
preregister their meta-analysis of coordinated trials. Table 1 describes 
central pillars of the initiative.
DESIGN
In our inaugural Metaketa cluster, field experiments randomized 
exposure to information about incumbents’ performance in office. 
Throughout the world and perhaps especially in developing democ-
racies, voters lack access to information about politicians, government 
performance, and public services. In Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, a recent 
survey found that 80% of parents with children in primary education 
were unaware of how their children’s school fared in the latest round 
of national examinations, 39% did not know whether teachers at the 
school came to work, and 25% could not say whether the school had 
toilets (5). Graft is ubiquitous in India: More than 65% of citizens 
report having paid a bribe to access public services over the past year. 
Yet, dozens of anticorruption activists have been murdered after 
legally requesting information under the country’s Right to Infor-
mation Act (5). In addition, deadly antigovernment protests in Caracas 
in 2014 barely appeared on Venezuelans’ television screens. State con-
trol of the media ensured that coverage was limited and sanitized (5). 
These knowledge deficits are problematic on both normative and 
instrumental grounds; many political theorists suggest that an in-
formed electorate is vital to a well-functioning democracy. It stands to 
reason that without transparency and a steady flow of reliable infor-
mation, the corridors of power are likely to be filled with “bad types” 
of politicians who face few incentives to perform their duties, who 
may steal from the citizens they are supposed to serve, and yet who 
are nonetheless reelected. For this reason, donors, activists, and non-
governmental organizations have seen greater transparency as a remedy 
for what ails democracy. They have sought to repackage and dis-
seminate information on politician performance obtained from 
government audits, publicly available administrative data, official 
records, and freedom of information requests.
We sought to test the impact of disseminating similar informa-
tion in our Metaketa cluster. In their common intervention arms, 
intended for inclusion in the pooled analysis, each study provided 
objective, nonpartisan performance information privately to indi-
vidual voters within 2 months prior to an election. The information 
was disseminated by flyers, text messages, or videos; was attributable 
to incumbent politicians or their parties; and was benchmarked to 
the performance of other politicians, either regionally or nationally. 
The substance of the interventions focused on legislative behavior 
(Benin), municipal spending irregularities (Brazil), the quality of 
public services (Burkina Faso), municipal government malfeasance 
(Mexico), policy positions and professional experience (Uganda 1), 
and budget irregularities (Uganda 2). A planned seventh study on 
incumbent criminality (India) did not take place because of implemen-
tation challenges. While some theoretical models have highlighted 
possible differences between the electoral effects of disseminating 
information about politician actions as opposed to performance out-
comes, our indicators generally encompass both elements and high-
light how such a sharp distinction may often be impractical. Most 
research teams partnered with local organizations, including non-
governmental groups interested in remedying information deficits, 
to design and implement the studies. Researchers also committed to 
common ethical principles—such as seeking consent from both subjects 
and electoral authorities and providing only truthful nonpartisan 
information—that are critical with field experiments on elections. 
Further details appear in section S1 and will be the subject of a forth-
coming book (5).
These standard informational interventions mirror those for which 
donor and transparency organizations routinely advocate. Several of 
our studies also replicate or extend experimental treatments from the 
previous research literature. For example, compare work by Bidwell, 
Casey, and Glennerster to our Uganda 1 study; work by Chong et al. (12) 
to our Mexico study; or work by Ferraz and Finan (11) to our Brazil 
Table 1. Pillars of the Metaketa Initiative.  
Challenges for  
cumulative learning The Metaketa approach
1. Confounding in observational 
research
1. Randomized controlled trials 
(RCTs)
2. Limited external validity  
of single RCTs
2. Multiple studies in diverse 
contexts
3. Heterogeneous, scattered findings 3. Meta-analysis with overall finding
4. Diversity of interventions 4. Coordination on common arm intervention
5. Noncomparable measurement 
that impedes aggregation
5. Harmonized measurement of 
inputs, outcomes, and controls
6. Researcher incentives for 
innovation over replication
6. Study-specific interventions 
preserve innovation and allow 
analysis of comparative 
effectiveness
7. Private data 7. Open data and replication code
8. Errors in data or code 8. Third-party data analysis
9. Fishing (data mining, 
specification searching, and 
failure to account for multiple 
hypothesis tests)
9. Preanalysis plans with limited 
number of specified 
hypotheses
10. Publication bias 10. Publication of all registered analyses
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study. Further citations and discussion are in (5). Consolidating evi-
dence on the effectiveness of this type of voter information campaign is, 
therefore, critical.
We collectively preregistered hypotheses, measures, estimation 
strategies, and tests in our meta-preanalysis plan (MPAP; see section 
S1.1). Our primary outcome measure is a binary variable that takes a 
value of 1 if a citizen reported voting for the incumbent candidate or 
party (depending on the study) and 0 if he or she did not; a secondary 
dichotomous outcome measures individual voter turnout. Each study 
administered postelection surveys to measure electoral behavior. Three 
studies used secret-ballot measures of self-reported vote choice, and 
others verified electoral turnout through factual questions that only 
voters who had cast a ballot were likely to answer correctly (see section 
S1.2, table S1). We collected data on intermediate outcomes, such as 
perceptions of candidate integrity and effort, or the occurrence of 
politician campaigns in response to negative information; we also 
measured possible moderators at baseline, such as coethnic and partisan 
ties between citizens and politicians. Symmetric measurement across 
studies facilitates pooling of results.
We hypothesized that the effect of information is likely to de-
pend on what voters already know or believe. Most studies used pre-
intervention surveys to measure voters’ prior beliefs and assess 
whether the provided information would be “good news,” i.e., infor-
mation that exceeded prior beliefs about politicians’ performance, 
or “bad news,” i.e., information that fell short of prior beliefs. For 
example, in Benin, voters were asked in baseline surveys whether they 
believe their representative to the National Assembly participates in 
plenary sessions “much more,” “a little more,” “a little less,” or “much less” 
than other deputies. In Brazil, preintervention surveys asked voters 
whether an independent auditor had rejected the mayor’s municipal 
accounts because of financial irregularities. In these and other studies, 
the experimental interventions then provided information on actual 
performance on the same scale used to measure the prior beliefs. 
Thus, in Benin, politicians in the 75th to 100th percentile of participa-
tion were said to participate much more, those in the 50th to 75th 
percentile participate a little more, and so forth. Examples are included 
in section S1.3. To construct the information on politician performance, 
studies relied on official reports of the National Assembly (Benin), 
third-party audits (Brazil, Mexico, and Uganda 2), expert assessments 
of candidates’ attributes and policy positions (Uganda 1), and an 
independent municipal government performance survey carried out 
by the researchers (Burkina Faso).
Using raw data from the baseline surveys and interventions, Fig. 1 
plots performance information (Q) against prior beliefs (P) in each 
of the six completed studies (left side of the figure) as well as com-
bined across studies (right side). The density of the dotted areas is 
proportionate to the number of voters at each value of Q and P. As 
we prespecified in our MPAP in section S1.1, news is considered good 
if information exceeds priors (Q > P) or if it confirms positive priors 
(Q = P, and Q is greater than the median value); otherwise, it is bad. 
Thus, the good news group lies above the 45° line in the plots in 
Fig. 1, while the bad news group lies below. In the case of the one 
study, Mexico, that lacked a baseline survey, the figure shows the 
distribution of politician information; we consider voters to be in the 
good news group if Q is greater than the median value. Figure 1 under-
scores several related points. First, prior perceptions of politicians 
are substantially varied, both within and across the good and bad 
news groups. Second, voters in the bad news group do tend to have 
more positive prior perceptions of their representatives (although 
priors do not alone determine bad or good news, since that depends 
as well on the performance information), and the figure indicates a 
positive relationship between voters’ prior assessments of politicians’ 
performance and objective measures of their performance. Last, 
however, this relationship is quite weak (the correlation between 
Q and P across all studies is r = 0.053). Thus, there is substantial scope 
for voters to update their beliefs in light of factual information about 
politicians’ behavior.
Our core preregistered hypotheses were simple: Positive informa-
tion (good news) increases voter support for politicians, while nega-
tive information (bad news) decreases support. We also expected the 
effect of information to be increasing in the gap between informa-
tion Q and priors P. We theorized that these impacts would operate 
by changing beliefs about candidates’ integrity and work ethic and 
would be strongest for nonpartisan and non-coethnic voters. If in-
formation campaigns are to reduce information deficits and boost 
accountability, then these basic effects on voters’ beliefs and behaviors 
are crucial.
To test these hypotheses in our meta-analysis, we estimate the 
average causal effect of information for two groups of voters: those 
for whom the information would be (a) good news and (b) bad news, 
depending on their priors. Each study randomly assigned the provision 
of information within each group, often further blocking random-
ization on background characteristics. To estimate effects, we rely 
on block-average differences of means, estimated using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) with fixed effects for randomization blocks. Confidence 
intervals (CIs) are calculated from SEs clustered at the level of ran-
domization, while we use randomization inference to calculate 
p-values. In table S5, we also present regressions that adjust for pre-
treatment covariates and estimate the interactive effect of treatment, 
conditional on a measurement of the gap between the information 
and prior beliefs. The pooled sample consists of 24,007 individual 
observations in 1330 randomization blocks in six studies.
We are able to calculate, ex post, the statistical power of our meta- 
analysis using a simulation approach, which takes into account the 
specific randomization schemes in the different studies and ob-
served variance in outcomes across randomization blocks (see sec-
tion S1.6). To register a statistically significant result on our primary 
outcomes with 80% probability, the interventions would have had 
to change the vote choice of about 5 of every 100 voters and the 
turnout decision of 4 of every 100 voters. Given that the experimen-
tal interventions introduced often new information (per Fig. 1) and 
therefore could have had important effects on electoral behavior, 
we interpret these calculations as evidence that null results were not 
forgone conclusions.
RESULTS
Figures 2 and 3 show the average effects of the informational treatments 
across all completed studies. The overall effects on our primary out-
come variable, vote choice, are statistically indistinguishable from 
zero, both in the good news group (point estimate, 0.62 percentage 
points; 95% CI, −1.95 to 3.19) and the bad news group (point estimate, 
0.36 percentage points; 95% CI, −2.80 to 3.51). We also find no evi-
dence that the impact of treatment assignment interacts with the gap 
between prior beliefs (P) and the information (Q) (table S5). As Fig. 3 
shows, we also find null overall results for our secondary outcome, 
voter turnout. In the pooled meta-analysis in Figs. 2 and 3, we estimate 
the average study-level effect of the treatments across the set of six 
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completed experiments. We also prespecified a secondary Bayesian 
analysis, in which we assume that each treatment effect is drawn from 
a common population of effects. This approach involves stronger 
assumptions than our primary approach, but it allows assessment of 
the likelihood of effects for each study in light of learning from the 
other studies (see MPAP in section S1.1). However, this analysis pro-
duces similar substantive conclusions (figs. S7 and S8).
Figures 2 and 3 also display study-specific results for each of the 
six completed experiments using our preregistered specification for 
the common arm interventions. Despite substantial contextual dif-
ferences, we cannot reject the null hypothesis for either good or bad 
news for any single study in the case of vote choice. Moreover, the 
estimates are close to zero in nearly every study. In two of the three 
studies where the effect estimates are furthest from zero in absolute 
value, the statistically insignificant effect appears in the theoretically 
unexpected direction (a positive effect of bad news in Burkina Faso 
and a negative effect of good news in Mexico). In the case of turnout, 
all but one of the study-specific estimates are statistically insignificant 
according to p-values based on randomization inference. Our power 
to reject the null hypothesis of no effect of the common intervention 
is much less for individual studies. Yet, similar findings from multiple 
studies boost our confidence that the overall effect of the standardized 
voter information campaigns is weak.
How robust are these null findings? Our primary estimations closely 
follow our registered MPAP and study-specific preanalysis plans. In 
some cases, the preanalysis plans were not sufficiently specific or could 
allow for different interpretations, proposed more than one strategy 
(for instance, inclusion or exclusion of covariates), or research teams 
found study-specific deviations appropriate. We present a type of 
specification curve analysis that shows the robustness of results to 
these unregistered analytic choices. See (5) for further discussion of 
specification curves, as developed by Simonsohn et al. (21). Thus, 
we estimate a set of 18,886 model specifications reflecting all possible 
combinations of these deviations and ex post decisions. Figure 4 shows 
results from the full set of models for vote choice, while Figure 5 
depicts results across specifications for turnout. In each figure, the 
plot in the top panel shows estimated effects of good news, and the 
bottom panel shows bad news. In each plot, the horizontal axis depicts 
the estimated average treatment effect, while the vertical axis lists the 
set of decisions (see sections S2.2 and S2.3). Decisions come in pairs 
(e.g., unadjusted versus covariate-adjusted analysis), with the exception 
of an unregistered “leave-one-out” analysis in which we calculate the 
overall meta-analysis estimate, excluding one study at a time. Within 
the row associated with a particular decision, that decision is held fixed, 
and estimates from all other possible specifications, i.e., specifications 
based on all combinations of other decisions, are presented. (We exclude 
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Fig. 1. Prior beliefs and politician performance. The figure plots performance information (Q) against prior beliefs (P) in each of the studies (left) and across all studies 
(right). Voters are in the good news group (gray) if information exceeds priors (Q > P) or if it confirms positive priors (P = Q, and Q is greater than median); otherwise, they 
are in the bad news group (black). On the right side, P and Q are standardized with a mean of 0 and an SD of 1 in each study. The density of the dotted areas is proportionate 
to the number of voters at each value of P and Q; for the pooled analysis, the rugs along the horizontal and vertical axes indicate the distribution of values. The Mexico 
study lacked a preintervention survey; thus, we determine the good news and bad news groups according to whether Q is greater than the median. The red lines indicate 
the linear fit between priors and information. For the pooled analysis, the slope of the fit is 0.071; the correlation is 0.053.
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sets of specifications that are not plausible, such as choosing to re-
code a variable in a particular study when that study is excluded from 
the analysis.) Each vertical dash in the body of the plot denotes a 
point estimate for a single model. We darken those estimates that 
are nominally statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The first row of 
each plot shows the collection of estimates from all specifications and, 
thus, depicts the overall proportion of estimates that are nominally 
significant.
We find that the null results are highly robust for the overall effect 
of the common information arm across the six completed studies. 
For vote choice, significant effects of good news about politician per-
formance materialize only in 0.3% of specifications; for bad news, 
the treatment effect estimate is significant in 0.6% of specifications. 
For turnout, we find significant effects in a larger proportion (10.3%) 
of bad news specifications, but in no cases do we find evidence of an 
overall effect of good news. It bears emphasis that these specifica-
tions are not a random draw from a set of all possible specifications; 
rather, they reflect ex post decisions that may move in the direction 
of estimating significant effects. The analysis also allows us to un-
derstand which specific decisions are necessary to obtain significant 
results in our meta-analysis. For example, specifications in the bad 
news/vote choice analysis are significant only in the presence of 
specific choices related to the Uganda 2 study [excluding candidates 
who switched parties and including Local Council V (LCV) coun-
cilors] and when we exclude Burkina Faso from the meta-analysis. 
The significant specifications in the bad news/turnout case occur over a 
wider range of choices, with no particular choice decisively needed to 
obtain significance. See section S2.3 for discussion. In the online ma-
terials, we also present a flexible interface (an R-based Shiny app) that 
allows users to vary specification choices themselves and assess the im-
pact for overall and study- specific results (see http://egap.org/content/
metaketa-i-shiny-app).
In addition, we conduct a sensitivity analysis, in which we ask how 
big (in absolute value) the estimated effect in the uncompleted India 
study would have needed to be to produce a non-null estimated effect 
in a seven-study meta-analysis. In the good news case, we would have 
required an estimated effect of at least 17.2 percentage points, an 
extremely large effect, much bigger than anything we see in other 
studies (section S2.4). Unreliability of self-reported voting data also 
does not likely explain our null effects: Any reporting biases might lead 
voters in the treatment group to overreport vote choice for incumbents, 
at least in the good news group, leading us to falsely reject true null 
hypotheses—rather than fail to reject false nulls.
DISCUSSION
What explains the weak overall effect on voter behavior of these 
common, potentially scalable informational interventions? There are 
many necessary steps in a causal chain linking information to voters’ 
decision-making process and, ultimately, to greater political account-
ability (13, 24). In our studies, information existed and was dissemi-
nated. The extent to which voters understood the information varied 
markedly across studies, with nonresults in some studies suggesting 
real difficulties of disseminating information effectively, a feature that 
Treatment effect of good news on vote choice
Effect sizes (95% confidence)
p = 0.67
p = 0.15
p = 0.4
p = 1
p = 0.62
p = 0.97
p = 0.7
−0.15 −0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15
Uganda 2
Uganda 1
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Burkina Faso
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Overall
Treatment effect of bad news on vote choice
Effect sizes (95% confidence)
p = 0.64
p = 0.92
p = 0.61
p = 0.12
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p = 0.99
p = 0.86
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Fig. 2. Meta-analysis: Country-specific effects on vote choice. Estimated change in the proportion of voters who support an incumbent after receiving good news 
(left) or bad news (right) about the politician, compared to receiving no information. Unadjusted estimates. For estimating the average of the study-specific effects (top row), 
each study is weighted by the inverse of its size. Horizontal lines show 95% CIs for the estimated change. Entries under each estimate show p-values calculated by random-
ization inference. In all cases, the differences are close to zero and statistically insignificant.
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is likely to be a concern with many informational campaigns more 
broadly (tables S8 and S9). Perhaps most critically, however, the in-
formation did not, on average, have any discernible effect on percep-
tions of politicians’ integrity and effort (table S10). In unregistered 
analyses, we do not find that this effect interacts with respondents’ 
perceptions of the credibility of the source of the information (table 
S11). Our data thus suggest that these standard types of informational 
campaigns simply did not induce voters to update their beliefs or 
produce meaningful change in their perceptions.
These results do not imply that informational interventions can 
never be effective. The structure of our Metaketa, with its distinction 
between common and study-specific interventions, was designed to 
allow initial assessment of hypotheses about how modifications of 
standard information provision campaigns might make them more 
impactful. In alternative intervention arms, for example, three studies 
in our cluster provided information to voters in a public setting, rather 
than privately to individual voters, on the theory that this could 
generate common knowledge of the intervention and foment coor-
dination between voters. In a preregistered analysis pooling data from 
these studies, we find a large and significant effect of the informa-
tional treatment in the public condition in the good news, but not 
the bad news, case, albeit driven by a large effect in one study (tables 
S21 and S22). This could relate to previous nonexperimental as well 
as experimental findings that the presence of robust media markets 
can amplify the impact of information (11, 25–28). In preregistered 
study-specific analyses, the Benin study also finds that prompts on 
the importance of the domain about which information is provided, 
as well as efforts to augment coordination across villages, can boost 
the effectiveness of standard informational interventions, and the 
Uganda 1 study finds that their intervention shapes choices in favor 
of opposition candidates. When examining precinct-level electoral 
returns, the Mexico study, which assigned treatment to most house-
holds within treated precincts, finds that the provision of performance 
information increased incumbent vote share, but significantly less so 
where reported malfeasance was greater. (The authors of the Mexico 
study regard the precinct-level electoral returns as more reliable, given 
that the secret ballot technique used to elicit survey-based vote choices 
was confusing to many voters.) These and other examples are dis-
cussed at more length in (5). The Uganda 2 study presents evidence 
of impact of information about district councilors at one level of 
government but finds no impact of information about district chair-
persons (29). These study-specific findings are intriguing and should 
be the subject of further comprehensive research. For example, the 
effects of public dissemination could be tested rigorously as the 
common intervention in a new Metaketa cluster.
The structure of our initiative also allows us to test some exploratory 
findings from one study against data from the collection of studies 
as a whole. For example, if one variable is an important feature driving 
effects in one study, then this can be tested systematically using data 
from other studies. While there is evidence from one of our experi-
ments that coethnicity moderates the effect of information (30), overall 
we do not find that effects vary as a function of coethnic, copartisan, 
or clientelistic relationships between voters and individual candidates 
(table S15). We also explored whether local contextual factors, such 
as the extent of electoral competition, condition the impact of the 
treatments, but find no evidence that they do (tables S16 and S17). 
Last, although we detect some signs that politicians may seek to under-
mine the dissemination of negative information (table S13), a salient 
feature of the individual studies in Mexico and India, we also find 
null results in studies where there is no evidence of this backlash. 
Treatment effect of good news on voter turnout
Effect sizes (95% confidence)
p = 0.97
p = 0.03
p = 0.46
p = 0.27
p = 0.22
p = 0.54
p = 0.87
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Treatment effect of bad news on voter turnout
Effect sizes (95% confidence)
p = 0.95
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Fig. 3. Meta-analysis: Country-specific effects on turnout. See notes to Fig. 2. In all but one test, the differences are close to zero and are statistically insignificant, using 
p-values from randomization inference.
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In our case, the consistency of the null estimated effects—despite 
heterogeneity in the substance of the information and across the con-
texts in which the experiments were fielded—therefore reinforces 
confidence in the overall finding.
This mode of out-of-sample testing illustrates a general source of 
leverage in the Metaketa approach, which may prove helpful in cases 
where results are more varied across studies than they were in ours. 
Suppose, for instance, that we had found positive effects in some 
studies but negative or null effects in others. This would have raised 
an explanatory challenge, since contexts vary in many ways. It would 
be difficult or impossible to identify which source of study-level 
variation accounts for the different estimated effects. However, the 
Metaketa approach allows for principled ex ante commitment to test-
ing how different dimensions of heterogeneity condition treatment 
effects, not at the study level but by combining within-study and cross- 
study information, as in the analysis of our moderating effect of co-
ethnicity. This strategy can substantially ameliorate the “degrees of 
freedom” problem and could prove important in the analysis of 
four additional Metaketa clusters that are currently underway. See 
https://egap.org/metaketa for information on the other Metaketa 
clusters.
In our Metaketa cluster, the core findings provide an important 
cautionary note on the limits of using blanket informational inter-
ventions to improve democratic accountability. Focusing on our pre-
specified estimation strategies but also exploring several deviations 
from these plans, we find no evidence of overall impact of standard, 
nonpartisan voter information campaigns targeted to individual 
voters. Exploratory and subgroup analyses, as well as evidence from 
Leave out: Include all
Leave out: Benin
Leave out: Brazil
Leave out: Burkina Faso
Leave out: Uganda 1
Leave out: Mexico
Leave out: Uganda 2
Burkina: M1=0 when M3=0
Burkina: M1 not recoded
Uganda 1: News=0 when P=Q
Uganda 1: News!=0 when P=Q
Mexico: News coded using posterior−prior
Mexico: News coded using Q
Uganda 2: Exclude uncontested seats
Uganda 2: Include uncontested seats
Uganda 2: Exclude LCV councilors
Uganda 2: Include LCV councilors
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N
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 included as covariate
All specifications
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Fig. 4. Robustness of findings across specifications: Vote for incumbent. Estimates across all specifications of the overall treatment effect of the common informa-
tional intervention on vote for incumbent. The vertical axis lists all considered specification choices. The top row shows the collection of estimates across all specifications. 
Each subsequent row holds fixed a given specification choice and shows the distribution of treatment effect estimates, varying all other choices. Darkened vertical lines 
show estimates for which p < 0.05. The dashed vertical line indicates the estimated average treatment effect reported in table S5.
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preregistered study-specific interventions, suggest modifications 
that could make informational campaigns more effective, and, of 
course, we cannot rule out the possibility that interventions at a much 
greater scale could have positive effects. Yet, this evidence suggests 
that typical transparency promotion efforts, such as those backed by 
civil society organizations and donors, may not pack a strong enough 
punch to influence voter behavior. These conclusions should provide 
useful input for policymakers because the interventions we studied are 
typical of many ongoing real-world programs. These results also in-
form basic science: If individual voters are slow to respond to new 
facts to update their beliefs, then this calls into question the premise of 
many theoretical models that voters have an appetite for information 
and use it to exert control over politicians.
Null effects such as those presented here are important for scientific 
progress and policy-relevant learning, yet they are too rarely published. 
The consistency of our results underscores the value of replicating 
similar studies in diverse settings: Despite the heterogeneity of contexts, 
the estimated effects of the baseline informational interventions are 
quite uniformly weak. Our findings thus establish a comprehensive 
evidence base against which the efficacy of alternative types of in-
formational interventions may be judged.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We coordinated on the design of seven field experiments in six coun-
tries that provided information on politician or party performance 
to voters and assessed the consequences for electoral behavior. One 
study could not be implemented because of challenges in the field. 
We collectively preregistered our hypotheses, measures, and the es-
timating equations used in our meta-analysis (see the MPAP in section 
S1.1). In the Supplementary Materials, we provide further informa-
tion on the individual study designs (section S1.2) and describe the 
information delivered in each study’s common intervention arm 
(section S1.3). To test our hypotheses about the effects of positive 
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Fig. 5. Robustness of findings across specifications: Turnout. See notes to Fig. 4.
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and negative information, we divided subjects into groups, based on 
whether they would receive good or bad news if exposed to the treat-
ment (see the Supplementary Materials for definitions). In all but one 
study, preintervention surveys allowed us to define these good and 
bad news groups based on the individuals’ prior beliefs. We randomly 
assigned the information treatment to some respondents and not to 
others within the good and bad news groups. Section S1.4 reports 
descriptive statistics, while section S1.5 shows that treatment and 
control groups are statistically balanced on prognostic pretreatment 
covariates. Section S1.6 reports an ex post simulation that shows our 
statistical power to detect effects.
Statistical analysis
In Figs. 2 and 3, we report average treatment effects estimated with 
block-average differences of means within each of the good and bad 
news subgroups, without covariate adjustment. The p-values calcu-
lated by randomization inference can differ from those implied by 
the model-based CIs, also reported in Figs. 2 and 3, because the random-
ization tests accurately reflect complexities of the individual designs, 
such as blocking or clustering of random assignment. For the overall 
analysis in Figs. 2 and 3, we take as our primary estimand the average 
of the six study-specific treatment effects. Accordingly, our estimator 
weighs each study by the inverse of its size. Unweighted analysis pro-
duces substantively similar results, as does covariate-adjusted analysis 
(see the Supplementary Materials for details).
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/5/7/eaaw2612/DC1
Section S1. Study design materials and methods
Section S2. Primary analysis: Robustness and reliability of results
Section S3. Secondary analysis: A Bayesian approach
Section S4. Possible explanations for the null findings
Section S5. Effects of publicly disseminated information
Table S1. Individual study designs.
Table S2. Descriptive statistics for sample of good news.
Table S3. Descriptive statistics for sample of bad news.
Table S4. Balance of covariates.
Table S5. Effect of information, conditional on distance between information and priors, on 
vote choice, and turnout.
Table S6. Deviations from MPAP and study PAPs in the meta-analysis.
Table S7. Differential attrition.
Table S8. Manipulation check: Effect of treatment on correct recollection, pooling good and 
bad news (unregistered analysis).
Table S9. Manipulation check: Absolute difference between posterior and prior beliefs for 
pooled good and bad news (unregistered analysis).
Table S10. Effect of information on perception of importance of politician effort and 
honesty.
Table S11. Effect of information and source credibility on evaluation of politician effort and 
honesty (unregistered analysis).
Table S12. Relationship between evaluation of politician effort and honesty with vote choice 
(unregistered analysis).
Table S13. Effect of bad news on politician backlash.
Table S14. Additional hypotheses and results.
Table S15. Effect of moderators on incumbent vote choice.
Table S16. Effect of information and context heterogeneity on incumbent vote choice.
Table S17. Effect of information and electoral competition on vote choice.
Table S18. Effect of information and intervention-specific heterogeneity on vote choice.
Table S19. Interaction analysis: Effect of good news on incumbent vote choice.
Table S20. Interaction analysis: Effect of bad news on incumbent vote choice.
Table S21. Private versus public information: Effect of good news on incumbent vote choice.
Table S22. Private versus public information: Effect of bad news on incumbent vote choice.
Fig. S1. Benin—Graphical representation of provided information.
Fig. S2. Brazil—Flyers distributed to voters.
Fig. S3. Burkina Faso—Flashcard illustrations of municipal performance indicators.
Fig. S4. Mexico—Example of benchmarked leaflet in Ecatepec de Morelos, México.
Fig. S5. Uganda 1—Candidate answering questions during a recording session and candidate 
as seen in video.
Fig. S6. Power analysis of minimal detectable effects, computed using Monte Carlo simulation.
Fig. S7. Bayesian meta-analysis: Vote choice.
Fig. S8. Bayesian meta-analysis: Turnout.
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